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THIRD FORCE HOUSING IN CANADA:
PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS
By JFFRY A. HousE*
An unassisted free market in housing is a thing of the past in Canada.
Governments set housing targets, and cite, both in the House of Commons
and in free-time political broadcasts,1 the number of annual housing starts as
accomplishments of their administrations. Central Mortgage and Housing
Corporation (CMHC), a Crown corporation, conducts myriad housing
assistance programmes involving low cost loans, grants, loan guarantees, inexpensive land costs and servicing of land.
This assistance goes to home buyers, public housing tenants, entrepreneurs, provinces, and municipalities. It is also beginning to go to non-profit
co-operative associations, and non-profit housing corporations, which together
constitute the class of housing which is the subject of this article, third force
housing.
A.

THE MARKET AS DISTRIBUTOR OF HOUSING STOCK
Housing space is distributed in Canada through a market mechanism
which has been modified by various governmental policy initiatives. In assessing the likely success or failure of any governmental housing programme, it
is important to understand how that market mechanism would operate without the intervention of the state in distribution. A structure of market
demands can only be derived from the behaviour of consumers who are
equipped with money to make demands; a theory of distribution cannot be
independent of the structure of the distribution of wealth as an initial premise.
Consequently, we must turn to the distribution of wealth as our first clue
to the tendencies inherent in the Canadian market.
In fact, the distribution of wealth and income has been exhaustively
catalogued, both in Canada and in the rest of the Anglo-American world.2
* © Copyright, 1976, Jeffry A. House.
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1
See Can. H. of C. Debates, (Mar. 25, 1975) at 2623 for one of many examples.
The Minister of Urban Affairs, the Hon. Barnett Danson appeared on The Nation's
Business in January, 1976 in this connection.
2 See, for Canada: Report of the Senate Special Committee on Poverty (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1971); L. Johnson, Poverty in Wealth (Toronto: New Hogtown

Press, 1974); Fortin, Godfrey & Ross, eds., Report to The Canada Council on Social
Development, excerpted in Toronto Star (Sept. 24, 1973) at 8; Statistics Canada, Income
Distributionsby Size in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1973).
For U.S.A.: J. Smith, ed., National Bureau of Economic Research, The Personal
Distributionof Income and Wealth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975); U.S.

Commerce Dept. Survey of Current Business (Nov. 1974).
For Britain: R. Titmuss, Income Distribution and Social Change (London: 1965);
A. B. Atkinson, Unequal Shares: Wealth in Britain (London: Penguin, 1974).
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Put bluntly, wealth is very inequitably distributed in this country, and the
distribution of money incomes is steadily increasing the share of the gross
national product received by the comparatively rich, while diminishing the
share received by the comparatively poor. Since 1951, the upper one-fifth
of Canadian individual income recipients have increased their share of the
national income from 45 per cent to 49.2 per cent in 1971. The poorest
one-fifth of Canadians saw their share drop from 3.2 per cent to a mere
2 per cent of national income. The lower 60 per cent of income recipients
experienced a decline in their share from 29.8 per cent to 24.7 per cent
of all income.3
This trend has continued for at least twenty-five years, the period during
which records have been kept. It has serious consequences for housing policy.
Since the investment of private funds depends upon a perceived demand for
housing, and that demand must be expressed by a willingness to make down
payments and pay carrying charges, private production of housing is heavily
directed toward the upper two-fifths of the population. Indeed, even with
the present level of governmental interference in the market, 80-85 per cent
of all new housing produced in Canada is directed toward that group, while
the remaining 15-20 per cent
of housing starts is expected to serve fully 60
4
per cent of the population.
Given the distribution of wealth which now exists in Canada, the market
mechanism must ignore a very substantial proportion of housing need. As
long ago as 1935, a government report recognised this: "There is no apparent
prospect of the low rental housing need being met through unaided private
enterprise building for profit."'5
It used to be thought, and it is sometimes still argued, that newly produced homes "trickle down" to the less well-off. 6 The latest federal report
on low income housing, however, concludes that "units aimed at the top of
the pyramid do not trickle down to the bottom fast enough". 7 This is especially
true in urban Canada, where the land underneath a dwelling often appreciates
at a rate far above the rate of depreciation of the structure resting upon it.
When units do reach the poor, they are likely to be in very bad shape. For
example, a 1966 Montreal study found that 16 per cent of the occupied
dwellings in the city were "not habitable". 8 The Paterson report, Toronto's
major survey of metropolitan housing needs, found that there were 220,045
families, and 138,708 individuals living in Metro Toronto who had "inade3 Statistics Canada, Perspective Canada: A Compendium of Social Statistics (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1974) at 156. Note that the table underestimates inequality by

excluding such factors as capital gains, gifts and imputed rents.
4 M. Dennis and S. Fish, Programsin Search of a Policy: Low Income Housing in
Canada (Toronto: Hakkert, 1972) at 18.
5 Can. Report to the Special ParliamentaryCommittee on Housing (Ottawa: King's

Printer, 1935) at 2.

6 Grisby, Housing Markets and Public Policy (Philadelphia: 1967).
7 Supra, note 4 at 19.
8 Conseil des Oeuvres de Montreal, Opgration Rdnovation Social (Montreal: 1966)
at 28-29.
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quate" shelter.9 And in Canada as a whole, the Fish-Dennis Report estimated
that in 1970 there were 1,115,000 dwelling units in Canada without central
heating, and 500,000 units without adequate plumbing facilities.10
If the trickle down theory does not insure that the middle and low
income Canadian is properly housed, is there any other operative tendency
in the economy which does? A common assumption has been that, while the
proportion of the national income which goes to lower income groups will
continue to decrease, the overall rate of economic growth will be sufficient
to insure that the real income of the poor will rise. Unfortunately, this
assumption appears not to be borne out in fact. During the past two years,
there has been virtually no real growth of the Gross National Product (GNP)
in Canada, and there have, at times, been substantial contractions of GNP.
The federal government's wage guidelines, on the other hand, indicate an
expected maximum real growth in Canadian economic output of 2 per cent
per annum. 1 At this rate, there is no realistic possibility that the poor will
ever be provided with housing by the unassisted market.
A final nail in the coffin of unassisted market distribution of housing
is provided by the research of Mark Kelman, who exhaustively studied 62
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States. His study concludes that, so far as goods (such as housing) which demonstrate supply
inelasticity are concerned, access to the goods in question is not determined
by the real wealth or the real income of a given group, but by the degree of
inequality in the relevant market.12 In other words, increases in real wealth
of poorer groups do not necessarily put them in a better position to acquire
housing through the market if inequality is simultaneously growing. As noted
above, this is precisely the situation in Canada.
B.

THE TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Without government action, the market mechanism leaves gaping holes
in the supply of shelter to Canadians. There are several policy approaches
which may be expected to alter this situation:
1) One can do away with the market in housing entirely, and treat
housing as a right, rather than a commodity to be bought and sold;
2) One can assist the market by building public housing for those people
who have no chance whatever to purchase or rent housing on the
market;
3) One can build public rental units for those totally unable to acquire
9 D. Paterson, Housing Needs in the Metropolitan Toronto PlanningArea (Toronto:
Mar. 1969) at 74.
lo Supra, note 4 at 44-45.
11The Anti-Inflation Act, S.C. 1975, c. 75.
12 M. Kelman, The Social Costs of Inequality, Dissent (Summer 1973) at 291-98.
Readers interested in the theoretical basis of these empirical conclusions are referred
to A. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (London: 1920).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voL.. 14, NO. I

shelter through the market, and subsidise either builders or consumers in the middle levels of the market.
The government of Canada, whether Conservative or Liberal, has steadfastly adhered to the third alternative. There has been strict adherence to the
principle that different forms of housing assistance are appropriate to different
income groups; generally, moderate income people are assisted with loan
guarantees, low cost mortgages and grants, and allowed to find housing of
their choice. Low income people usually have only one choice offered by their
government: to live in state owned housing. This state owned housing has
been deliberately constructed to be unappealing. As a director of CMHC
put it in a letter to the President of the Corporation:
It seems to me that public housing projects should also be at a minimum standard
as far as accommodation is concerned ....
This should be deliberately used not
only to achieve economy, but to make clear that we are not competing with private
enterprise, who we assume will be building a more attractive product for those
who can afford it.13

At present, public housing of this sort accounts for 1.9 per cent of the
nation's housing stock,' 4 which by government policy has been deliberately
populated with those who are in economic or social difficulty.' 5 It is usually
located on marginal land, far from employment centres and social amenities.
Accordingly, the Fish-Dennis Report recommended that the programme be
abandoned, "at least in its present form".' 6
While the public housing programme authorised under Part VI of the
National Housing Act' 7 was virtually the only housing programme designed
for the poorest group, various other programmes were created for lowermiddle and middle income Canadians. Only two need concern us here: first,
s. 15 "entrepreneurial full recovery housing", the so-called Limited Dividend
programme; and second, s. 34.15, the Assisted Home Ownership Programme
(AHOP).
The first of these involves a sub-market level loan to an entrepreneur
who agrees to rent at agreed rates; despite the connotation of the term
'Limited Dividends', there is no requirement that profits be limited, so long
as the rent schedule is followed. There have been numerous problems in the
programme, well summarised in the Fish-Dennis Report, and its predecessor,
the Charney Report.' 8 In 1968, it was dropped, but subsequently reinstated.
Among its drawbacks is the fact that very little is received in return for a
substantial public investment. Normally, the builder is able to 'mortgage
out', thereby receiving a loan from CMHC greater than the cost of conl Supra, note 4 at 174.
14 Supra, note I at 2628.
16 Ontario Association of Housing Authorities, Good Housing for Canadians

(Toronto: 1964) at 119.
10 Supra, note 4 at 9.
17 National Housing Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-10.
18 Supra, note 4 at 225-43; M. Charney, The Production and Availability of LowCost Housing (CMHC, 1971 unpub.) c. 4.
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structing the building. 19 Standards are poor, locations bad, and a builder
who has already made a profit by mortgaging out is often willing to walk
away from the project entirely rather than be stuck with a sub-market rental
structure.20 An even worse drawback has arisen recently in Ontario. CMHC
has refused to enforce the agreed upon rent levels; entrepreneurs have simply
raised rents above the prescribed level without getting required CMHC
approval. 21 While CMHC refuses to act, tenants cannot, as they are without
standing to enforce an agreement to which they are not parties.
The programme which has seen the greatest influx of funds in past years
is the Assisted Home Ownership Programme. Between 1973 and 1974,
CMHC raised its expenditures on the programme from $133,100,000 to
$435,200,000.22 Basically, the programme uses below-market loans combined
with capital grants, and in some provinces, government leased land, to benefit
individuals who wish to purchase a home, but are unable to do so. Among
the drawbacks is the fact that while it may assist in the purchase of a home,
the owner can then sell at market, making a large capital gain, with no long
term benefit to the public. Also, the subsidies required are very great if the
units are to go to the moderately poor, as originally proposed. The 1970
estimate was that the programme would serve the income group earning
from $4,000 to $6,000; in fact 48 per cent of the beneficiaries had incomes
above that.2 3 In March, 1975, the average recipient of AHOP assistance
was earning $9,336 per annum, and this figure cloaked the much higher
incomes of recipients in urban areas. 24 At this writing, single income families
qualify for aid if the wage earner earns $17,000 or less; if there are two wage
earners, the Ontario maximum is $19,000. For comparison's sake, it is
interesting to note that Toronto teachers, widely abused for their 'unreasonable' wage demands, earned in 1974-75 from $7,800 to $18,400. A new
contract awarded by arbitration provides beginning teachers with a starting
salary of $10,549, and those with full qualifications and twelve years' experience with $22,619,25 thus firmly placing nearly all teachers in a position
to qualify for a programme which CMHC unabashedly calls "aid to lower
income groups'. As a consequence of the extreme difficulty in building houses
which can be purchased by low income people, the Fish-Dennis Report
recommended that AHOP be discontinued in urban areas, where land costs
19 A builder mortgages out when he builds for the amount of the loan or less, and
consequently puts no equity into the building. Prior to 1969, loans were permitted up
to 95 per cent of the proven end cost of the building; after the Act was changed in that
year, the 95 per cent referred to appraised value, closely analogous to market value.
Thus, if one can build for under 95 per cent of market value, a profit is assured.
20 Supra, note 4 at 227.
21 At Richmond Square, Toronto, and Academy Heights, Thunder Bay. At this
writing, tenant strikes are in progress at both sites. See The Chronicle-Journal(Thunder
Bay: Feb. 9, 1976); Toronto Star (Feb. 17, 1976) at B-1.
22
CMHC Annual Report (Ottawa: 1974) at 17.
2
8 Supra, note 4 at 269.
24
Supra, note 1 at 2622.
25
Metropolitan Toronto Negotiators and District Presidents, Metro Negotiations
Newsletter, April 12, 1976.
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are prohibitive. 20 While the government has not publicly responded, it is true
that no AHOP units
were built in the City of Toronto in 1974, and only 191
in the Metro area.27
C.

THIRD FORCE HOUSING
If there is at least a private understanding that the programmes designed
to provide shelter for moderate and low income Canadians have been a failure,
there appears also to be a consensus as to the heir-apparent. As Toronto
Mayor, David Crombie, put it in a brief to a provincial task force on housing,
"Federal policies are moving in the direction of increased support for thirdforce, community-based, non-profit housing". 28 Crombie promised his support
for this shift in policy. Similarly, the New Democratic Party adopted a resolution on urban policy at its Vancouver convention which stated, "The NDP
will encourage co-operatives and non-profit groups to become major providers
of housing in Canadian cities".2 9 For its part, Parliament has passed three
bills since 1973 which widened the possibilities for the use of third force
housing in Canada's cities. As the then Minister of Urban Affairs, the Hon.
Ronald Basford said, "The Federal government believes that these organisations should be encouraged in this kind of work, and that they should get as
much help as possible".30
Third force, or community based, housing is so called in order to distinguish it from housing initiated by the private sector and remaining in
private hands, and also from public housing built under Part VI of the
National Housing Act, that is, housing initiated by Ottawa and owned by a
province. Third force housing comes in two forms: non-profit co-operative
housing, and simple non-profit housing.
1.

Co-operative Housing

The National Housing Act (N.H.A.) defines the phrase "co-operative
housing project" as "a housing project built by a co-operative association
incorporated under the laws of Canada or of any province".3 1 The definition
was subsequently broadened in 1973 by replacing the word "built" with the
words "built or acquired", 32 thus allowing co-operatives to use federal funding to purchase older homes for the first time.
In order to be a co-operative housing project for the purposes of the
N.H.A., one must incorporate either federally, under the Co-operative Associations Act,33 or provincially under the relevant statute. While each of the
20

Supra, note 4 at 20.
Supra, note 1 at 2628.
28
Brief to the Ontario Housing Advisory Task Force (Comay Commission) at 16.
20
Urban Policy Resolution #1, Housing As a Human Right at 2.
30
R. Basford, Explanatory Notes on The 1973 N.H.A. Amendments (Ottawa:
CMHC,
1973) at 5.
3
1Supra, note 17, s. 2.
32 By S.C. 1973-74, c. 18, s. 1.
38 S.C. 1970, c. 67.
27
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provincial acts has slightly different requirements concerning what actually
constitutes a co-operative association, the concept is most clearly presented
in the Manitoba Companies Act,34 which requires that in a co-operative,
every person has one vote, which may not be cast by proxy, and that "the
surplus funds arising from the business of the corporation be distributed
wholly or in part amongst the members, or among members and patrons,
in proportion to the volume of business which they have done with or through
the corporation". In housing corporations which are organised on a cooperative basis, this distribution to the membership normally takes the form
of lower rentals rather than cash payments, although the outcome is identical.3 5
Other provinces have more elaborate definitions, as does the federal
legislation. Saskatchewan requires that a co-op operate "as nearly as possible
at cost", 6 while Ontario requires the same thing in principle, and then
itemises expenditures
which will be considered as coming under the rubric
37
of "cost".

Housing co-operatives are usually set up on a membership loan basis,
although they may be created with share capital. A person wishing to be
housed in a co-operative signs an 'occupancy agreement', which is analogous
to a lease. The first condition of the agreement is that the prospective resident
agrees to loan a specified sum to the co-operative association. The signing
of the agreement, together with the payment of the loan, makes the signee
a member of the co-operative with all privileges, including the right to occupy
designated premises. The original function of the member loan was to provide
the co-operative with funds for a down payment on real property; since
co-operatives were eligible for a loan of 95 per cent of the full cost of the
property from CMHC, each member's loan was usually equal to 5 per cent
of the total value of the project, divided pro rata by the number of units.
Since CMHC now has statutory authority to provide 100 per cent mortgage
loans to co-operatives,38 the original purpose of the member loan has disappeared. Many co-operatives still use it to supplement liquidity and to
signify a commitment to the co-operative; insofar as it does remain, of course,
it acts as a bar to the use of the co-operative as a shelter device for most
poor Canadians.
The member loan makes one a member of the co-operative association.
A co-operative resident is therefore a voting member of the organisation
which has managerial authority over the premises, and, at the same time, a
so-called 'proprietary lessee' of the premises occupied. Popularly (but inaccurately) put, the tenant is the landlord. In fact, the co-operative corporation is the landlord, and the givers of member loans have powers similar to
shareholders in joint stock corporations to effect co-operative policy. The
R.S.M. 1964, c. 3, s. 396.
5 Although there is a difference for tax purposes, which encourages co-operative
housing projects to lower rents rather than raise incomes.
36 The Co-operative Associations Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 246, s. 2.
37 The Co-operative CorporationsAct, R.S.O. 1973, c. 101, s. 1(1) (6) (iv).
34
3

38 By s. 15.1 of the present National Housing Act, as am. by S.C. 1973-74, c. 18, s. 7.
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major distinction is that in the case of co-operatives, each member has one
vote, rather than voting rights being proportional to investment in the
corporation.
In Ontario, it is required by statute that every Ontario incorporated
co-operative have at least five directors who are to be elected from the membership for terms not to exceed five years; re-election is permitted. The Cooperative CorporationsAct,39 sets out subjects on which directors may pass
by-laws, with provision made for confirmation or variation of by-laws by the
members at general meetings, which are to take place at least annually. Ten
per cent of the members may requisition the directors to pass a by-law within
their powers; if the directors fail to act within twenty-one days, the requisitioning members may call a general meeting to be held within sixty days for
the purpose of putting the issue to a vote of the members. The decisions
of the co-operatives, democratically made, are expressed in by-laws. The
by-laws of a housing co-operative establish the size of the member loan, and
the size of the monthly housing charge which is applied to the mortgage.
By-laws may establish a procedure to be used to select new members, express
limitations on the right to alienate the member's interest, define what constitutes default in a member's obligations, and establish a schedule of maintenance duties.
The relationship of the corporation to its member residents is further
outlined in the occupancy agreement mentioned above. Since it is likely to
be the only legal document which a member resident will see, it normally sets
out the amounts of the loan, housing charge, incidental fees and other costs.
It also specifies which expenses are not covered, such as telephone, television
cable, and so on. Since the loan is a loan, the occupancy agreement provides
for its repayment upon termination, with or without an increment to replace
purchasing power eroded by inflation. Default is defined, and notice requirements are set out for those who wish to terminate without penalty. Some
occupancy agreements allow the co-operative to use the member-loan as a
security deposit to be set off against damage to the premises; it is uncertain
whether such a provision is legal in provinces such as Ontario, Quebec and
British Columbia, whose Landlord and Tenant Acts forbid security deposits.
Many Co-operative Associations Acts specify that a resident may not
alienate his interest in the co-operative under any circumstances, except
by resolution of the board of directors. This is necessary to prevent a member
from entering a co-operative which has below-market rents, and simply
assigning his interest to someone else at market rates. Often, occupancy
agreements reiterate the prohibition against alienation, and set out the circumstances under which directors may exercise their discretion to allow an
alienation. Making a profit is never allowed, at least by a co-operative which
intends to remain on good terms with CMHC; a rather common provision
allows a member to sublet his premises for three months every second year.
In co-operatives with substantial turnover, a similar result is achieved by

89 Supra, note 37.
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agreeing to grant priority status on the waiting list to ex-members who return
to the co-operative within a specified time period.
The most difficult legal questions affecting the affairs of housing cooperatives are undoubtedly those of characterising the interest of a member
resident in the occupied premises. Is the interest a real property interest
primarily, or an interest in personalty? Is the resident protected by the
sections of The Landlord and Tenant Act which apply to residential tenancies?
In Ontario, "tenant" is defined to include "lessee, occupant, subtenant,
undertenant, and his and their assigns and representatives"; 40 "landlord" is
also defined very broadly, to include, among other things "the person giving
or permitting the occupation of the premises in question". 41 Clearly, there is
nothing on the face of the statute which prevents the co-operative-resident
relationship from being covered by the Act. Since common law has long held
tenancy to be an estate in land, however, the wide terms of the definitions
have been narrowly construed. A court has held that rooming house occupants
are licensees, not tenants, and do not fall within the ambit of the term
"occupant" in the definition, at least for the purposes of a quasi-criminal
prosecution of a rooming house owner who changed locks on an overholding
resident. 42 Similarly, in cases where employees received an apartment as
partial consideration for their employment, or where apartments were available only to employees, the intervention of the contingency was held to create
a licence rather than a tenancy. 43 The question is what is "the true and
dominant relationship"? 44 While both personalty and real property considerations are involved, it is clear that in the case of a non-profit housing
corporation, the exchange of the member loan for a member loan certificate
is not the primary, or dominant aspect of the interactions: a contractual
relationship is entered into in order to secure shelter, not for the usual stock
market considerations; while the contracting party would likely forego receipt
of the member loan certificate if an exemption were granted, he would not
omit to take possession of the premises if that were not required.
If the true and dominant relationship in the dealings of a non-profit
housing corporation with a prospective resident is that of landlord and tenant,
a convenient basis is available for distinguishing Freeborn v. Goodman,45
the only Supreme Court of Canada decision in which the nature of the cooperative interest has been considered. In that case, purchasers of shares in
a co-operative corporation were held to have acquired "an equitable title
to the exclusive right of occupancy of their respective suites, and to quiet
possession thereof, so long as they remain owners of the shares allotted to
40 The Landlord and Tenant Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 236, s. 1(e).
41

Id., s. I(b).
R. v. Poulin, [1973] 2 O.R. 875 (P.C.J.).
43 Re York Central Hospital Association and Township of Vaughan, [1972] 1 O.R.
244; 22 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (H.C.); Lesperance v. Montague, [1947] O.W.N. 257; 3 D.L.R.
174 (C.A.).
44 Re Stratigeasand Sofronis et al., [1970] 3 O.R. 157 (C.CJ.).
45 Freeborn et al. v. Goodman, [1969] 6 D.L.R. (3d) 384 (S.C.C.).
42
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them". 40 If this reasoning is applied to non-profit co-operatives as well as
commercial co-operatives of the type which is based on share capital, as in
Freeborn v. Goodman, it amounts to a conclusion that the member loan is a
prime element in the transaction. This leads to the conclusion that Ontario's
Landlord and Tenant Act, explicitly designed for modern urban conditions,
would have no application to those who reside in what the government
assures us will be a major form of new housing. In that case, the only statute
directly bearing upon the rights of co-operative members would be The Cooperative CorporationsAct, or a version of it, which was fashioned largely
for the regulation of agricultural co-operatives. While the National Housing
Act requires that co-operatives be incorporated under co-operative corporations statutes, surely it does not require that they be governed in every respect
by them.
Two sections of Ontario's Co-operative CorporationsAct suggest the
difficulties if housing co-operatives are to fall within its ambit. Section 64(1)
requires that those who wish to withdraw from a co-operative must give
notice of their intention to do so to the secretary of the co-operative six
months before withdrawal takes place. It is clear that this is utterly impractical
for housing co-operatives, especially those designed to house moderate and
low income people in an urban environment.
Similarly inappropriate is s. 66, which establishes the procedure for
expulsion of a member from the co-operative. Under the section, a co-operative
must give a member ten days written notice of the fact that a meeting of the
board of directors is to be convened for the purpose of considering a resolution expelling that member from the co-operative. The reasons for which
the expulsion is sought must be set out in the notice, and the member is given
the right either to appear at the hearing personally, or to be represented
by agent or counsel. In Ontario, the full rights of The Statutory Powers
Procedure Act 47 are applicable. There is, in the event of an adverse decision
by the board of directors, a right of appeal to the membership of the cooperative at large to confirm, vary or set aside the resolution. A member
committed to delay could certainly frustrate the decision of the board for
several months, even without utilising the courts.
This provision is inappropriate for non-profit housing co-operatives.
First, the rights it establishes are, in some crucial particulars, narrower than
those under The Landlord and Tenant Act. Specifically, it requires only that
"the grounds upon which it is sought to expel" be set out in writing, whereas
s. 10 of The Landlord and Tenant Act requires that the ground for expulsion
from premises be one of the 'specified' grounds, such as undue damage,
contravention of health standards and the like.48 Clearly, then, co-operative
residents would be unprotected from expulsion on trivial grounds, provided
that the directors could be sure that their expulsion resolution had the backing
of 51 per cent of the membership. On the other hand, the unlimited right
40 Id.at 406.
S.O. 197,1,
47.
2. Sess.) c. 13, s.
48 This was enacted by S.O. 1975, (2nd
3.

47
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of appeal in The Co-operative CorporationsAct, s. 66, could allow an undue
prolongation of an expulsion by a member. Since the members of the cooperative are collectively responsible for the mortgage, the result of a longstanding unresolved expulsion could be to raise rents for people who can
ill afford it. It seems clear that the procedure in The Landlord and Tenant
Act, s. 103 (f) more closely approximates the needs of both the co-operative
and the resident in an expulsion situation.
The underlying difficulty, of course, is the assumption that the affairs
of all types of co-operative can be covered by the same legislation. Only the
Saskatchewan Co-operativeAssociations Act has a specific part dealing solely
with housing co-operatives, 49 and the issues canvassed above are not treated
there. Thus, in the rest of Canada we have, on the one hand, stirring calls
to use co-operatives as a major mode of shelter provision; on the other,
they are expected to run their affairs as if they were identical to feed-supply
or marketing co-operatives.
Supporters of co-operatives have clearly been guilty of overstating the
benefits of this kind of community democracy; nonetheless, its benefits are
real and tangible. The long term tendency in Canada has been the proportionate decrease in independent proprietors and increase in wage labourers;50
as the early English democrats knew,51 this increasing dependency implied
a less firm position from which to take part in political life. An analogous
tendency exists in housing; tenancy is replacing home ownership at a rapid
rate,52 and tenants who wish to take part in local affairs are liable to lose
their homes if their landlord disapproves.
Co-operatives go some distance toward the goal of firmly re-establishing
this independence in the residential area. The oft-expressed desire to have
control over the decisions which affect one's daily life is more likely to be
satisfied in a democratic co-operative than under virtually any form of tenancy.
2.

Non-Profit Housing

The other member of the class called third force housing is 'non-profit'
housing. For the purposes of the NationalHousing Act, a non-profit organisation is one "no part of the income of which is payable or is otherwise
available for the personal benefit of any proprietor, member, or shareholder
thereof". 53 The N.H.A. recognises two kinds of non-profit corporation. The
first is one which is "constituted exclusively for charitable purposes";5
49

R.S.S. 1965, c. 246, Part V.
50 L. Johnson, "The Development of Class in Canada in the 20th Century", in G.
Teeple, ed., Capitalism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1972).
51 Cf. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes
to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
52 L. Smith, Housing in Canada:Market Structure and Policy Performance (Ottawa:

Queen's Printer, 1971) at 33.
53S.C. 1974-75, c. 38, s. 1.
54 Supra, note 17, s. 15.1(1) (a).
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generally, these non-profits are incorporated by service clubs, unions, or
religious organisations. The second kind of non-profit corporation recognised
by the Act is "a housing corporation, all of the shares of which are owned
by a municipality"."5
Generally, non-profit housing corporations are of much less interest from
a legal standpoint than are co-operatives. The residents of the former are
the tenants of the corporation, and are governed by the law applicable to
tenants. They normally have no voice in the administration of their buildings,
and are unlikely to regard themselves as owners of their units. Unfortunately,
non-profit units of this sort are providing the lion's share of third force
housing in Canada, while non-profit co-operatives are slowly being shunted
into the background.

D. LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANCE FOR THIRD FORCE HOUSING
To see how this has happened, it is necessary to examine the assistance
mechanisms which have been adopted to aid the expansion of third force
housing, and the application of those mechanisms to urban Canada.
In 1972, Susan Fish and Michael Dennis published the results of their
CMHC study on low income housing, which had been undertaken to provide
background material for revisions of the N.H.A. in 1972, and a later possible
complete rewriting of the Act. As noted above, it recommended that Part VI
public housing and Limited Dividend housing be abandoned, and AHOP
excluded from urban areas. It was much more favourably disposed to third
force housing. Five recommendations were made:
1) Make 100 per cent loans to co-operatives and to other non-profit
institutions and groups;
2) Provide seed money for organisation and development;
3) Provide technical expertise directly, through the establishment of
independent advisory bodies and by funding groups to hire directly
the necessary expertise;
4) Adopt internal procedures which make [third force housing] far
more accessible and receptive to those groups;
5) Make shelter subsidies available for non-governmental non-profit
housing, and require a broad income mix. 56
In January, 1973, the minority Liberal government introduced a package
of amendments7 to the N.H.A., many of which have implications for third
force housing.
First, s. 34.18 gives CMI-C authority to loan money to co-operatives
which are constructing, acquiring, or improving a housing project. While
151d., s. 15.1(1) (c).
56 Supra, note 4 at 21-22.
57 Which became S.C. 1973-74, c. 18.
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CMHC has previously had this authority for forms of home ownership which
included co-operatives, the creation of a separate section allows the creation
of separate, favourable interest rates for co-operatives. Section 15.1 empowers
CMHC to make loans to third force housing groups up to 100 per cent of
the lending value of the project, in contrast to the usual 95 per cent maximum.
Section 15.1(2) allows the Corporation to make grants of up to 10 per cent
of capital cost to third force groups in unspecified circumstances. Finally,
s. 34.1 creates authority for $10,000 'start-up' grants to be given to cooperatives and non-profit corporations. It is expected that this money will
go for such expenses as research and organisation, incorporation, professional
fees, site selection, options and tenant selection.
While this package had a substantial effect on third force housing, the
lack of legislative authority to allow CMHC to lease federal land to cooperatives was seen as a major difficulty. During the 1974 election campaign,
the government announced that, if re-elected, it would bring in legislation
on this point. On January 27, 1975, Bill C-46 was introduced by the Minister
of Urban Affairs, the Hon. Barnett Danson. It gives CMHC authority to
acquire land, and lease it back to third force groups. Although Mr. Danson
avoided saying so in his discussion of the Bill, 58 this new power vested in
CMHC is made conditional upon the beneficiary not having received any contribution under s. 15.1(2). What was clearly promised as an additional
benefit to co-operatives became, in s. 21.1, an alternate benefit, to be received
if previously existing sections were not utilized. An amendment striking out
the words which made the two forms of relief alternate was offered by Mr.
Gilbert (NDP-Broadview) but was defeated. 59
In December, 1975, a third set of changes in the N.H.A. was passed by
Parliament. By a new version of s. 34.19, CMHC was empowered to make
yearly contributions to co-operatives to assist in paying municipal taxes, or
to assist in meeting mortgage obligations."0
There has, then, been substantial recent activity in the area of legislation
concerning third force housing. However, the actual impact upon the housing
situation has not been considerable.
E.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THIRD FORCE HOUSING TO THE
SOLUTION OF THE HOUSING PROBLEM

Any assessment of the actual impact of the government's third force
housing programme must begin with the admission that all the relevant data
do not yet exist. At this writing, CMHC's 1975 Annual Report is not available; nor is there any possibility of assessing the usefulness of Bills C-46
and C-77, which have only recently become law. Still, the 1973 amendments
to the N.H.A. have had time to begin to work; if they are to be judged a
success, they should have begun to show results.
58

5

Supra, note 1.

9The amendments were passed as S.C. 1974-75, c. 38.
60 S.C. 1974-75, c. 82, s. 5.
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The following table shows the number of housing units expected to result
from loans approved in each year. 61
ALL THIRD FORCE HOUSING
Self-contained

Hostel

Units

Accommodation

1969
1970
1971
1972

2237
3022
3280
1981

5940
9150
5523
3022

1973
1974

**
*

*
*
*
*
Non-Profit Units
SelfHostel
contained
Accommodation
Units

4314
4388

4210
3645

*

Co-operative Units

414
728

It is important to recognise that several thousand low income starts are
an accomplishment in an economy which would otherwise produce virtually
none; however, the conclusion is unavoidable that the amount is far from
that required to meet the need. The socially important element of third force
housing is its capability to provide an alternate source of inexpensive housing,
thereby acting as a drag upon the speculative private market. Yet this can
occur only where a substantial share of the housing stock is third force. At
present, Canada produces about 220,000 new units annually; the Minister of
Urban Affairs has set a 1976 target of 235,000.2 At existing levels of production, then, co-operatives account for about 0.3 per cent of housing starts,
and non-profit housing about 2 per cent. This 2.3 per cent of housing
starts constitutes only 0.5 per cent of housing stock. If a substantial departure
from present trends is not made, the year 2000 will see only about 2 per cent
of stock in the form of third force housing. Based on present levels of funding
and construction, Mr. Eric LeBourdais of the real estate developers' lobby,
the Urban Development Institute, will likely be correct in his assessment:
"And as for non-profit housing providing a pool of inflation-free housing,
it won't be a pool, it'll be a puddle." 63
It appears unlikely that co-operatives will be able to increase significantly
their share of the total housing stock. Countries with the most successful
co-operative movements are often those with strong labour movements, such
as in Scandinavia. These non-governmental organizations have been able to
provide personnel, technical resources and an ongoing commitment to cooperatives well above what Canadian co-operatives have been able to muster.
The third and fourth recommendations 64 of the Dennis-Fish Task Force have
61 CMHC Annual Reports (Ottawa: 1969-74).
a2 Toronto Star (Mar.5, 1976) at C-10.

03 The quotation is from "Homeowners Who Aren't", Toronto Life (Jan. 1976) at 23.
04 3) Provide technical expertise directly, through the establishment of independent

advisory bodies and by funding groups to hire directly the necessary expertise;
4) Adopt internal procedures which make [third force housing] far more accessible and receptive to those groups.
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not, so far as co-operatives are concerned, been implemented. But the underlying reality is that there are not enough community based groups with the
cohesion and perseverance required to establish and maintain a co-operative.
This becomes more true as one descends the ladder of income and status;
a neighbourhood unable to retain a lawyer, or an accountant, or anyone who
has ever completed a real estate transaction is unlikely to be successful in
creating a co-operative. In other words, the greater the need, the less likely
that it can be filled by co-operatives.
As for non-profit housing of the co-operative sort, the future is brighter
even if the benefits are not as great. Because of the greater involvement of
municipalities in its creation, the problems of expertise and perseverance are
largely solved. The major drawback remains funding from CMHC. Since
it does not incorporate the self-management provisions of co-operatives, it is
possible that its residents will feel themselves to be without a stake in the
success of the project; the active community which co-operatives promise is
sacrificed in order to achieve the benefit associated with an appreciable
number of units.
Co-operatives and non-profit housing were originally considered in
Canada because of the growing numbers of people unable to afford privately
developed housing, and the perceived failure of public housing programmes,
which involved the concentration of the poor in ghettoes. If the pitiful level
of co-operative production continues, it must be viewed as an interesting
experience for a lucky few, rather than a major housing programme. The
alternative, non-profit housing built by Crown or municipal corporations,
if carried out on a massive scale, has a chance of making an impact on the
housing crisis. So far, it has not lived up to its promise.

